They should conclude the agreement on the basis of good behaviour and well-being. My point is that a fruitful debate on ethics and public policy can begin by separating ethics from morality, to reduce the weight of the value of ethics. The development of accepted public policy standards will be much more difficult if we address an agreed morality that informs the content of public order in relation to my proposed approach to an agreed ethic that informs our role in the organization and management of public policy processes. My distinction is between morality as a world of deep substance and ethics as a flatter world of process. We live in both worlds, of course, but I suggest that ethics mark the agreed social space that we share when we play our assigned role in the public order process; and morality characterizes the personal space of the individual consciousness, which I share with my community of faith, no matter how small or small. What kind of ethics will serve our common goals, given that there are as many legitimate political communities as there should be in a democracy? My answer is an ethic of ordinary procedure, considered fair by as many political participants as possible. One of the ethical foundations of public order is the agreement on standards for due process by those who share the establishment and implementation of public order. Making these political relations correct means that we can recognize our common public role so that we can then agree on what the actors of the political process can reasonably expect from each other. Creating ethical foundations is therefore an exercise in building communities. Ethics has many dimensions.
I will shortly present my own political definition of ethics as not only individual”s “good conduct” but also “correct relations” between those who share political responsibilities. But before moving forward with my own definition, I would like to resign and learn about another political definition related to utilitarianism: the philosophical doctrine linked to influential political reforms in the 19th century, which contains a difficult alternative to my own approach to ethics and public policy. This influential ethical doctrine also concerns the relations of public power, but not the one that many contemporary democrats would call their own. I will check out the place of a fascinating school of esotericism in democratic public policy, inspired by the English utilitarian social theory of the 19th century, recently revived by Peter Singer.  This school of political thought has influenced political analysts not only in England, but also in the English-speaking world. Contemporary “ethical entrepreneurs” who want lessons on how to “make democracy more ethical” find them in classic utilitarian theorems like Sidgwick. Sidgwick stands out as an exemplary theorist of ethics and public order, which would reinforce the importance of elite school policy in what it is called “esoteric” social education, emerging democracy, by favouring a higher social morality but hidden by the lower social morality of the democrats. Sidgwick`s criticism of the promotion of “the utilitarianism of the house of government”: a form of political paternalism, no different from colonial rule, where a ruling class does the best to promote the well-being of peoples subject to it, to the point of concealing the underlying utilitarian logic of government programs, if it helps to cement the adherence of the population (Williams 1993 108-10).  John Rawls presented Sidgwick in his A Theory of Justice (1971) as an eminent representative of the (unqualified) virtues of utilitarianism.  This chapter recalls the role of political elites in democratic political systems and warns against the return of unethical use of “ethical discussions” in democratic public policy.